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I. INTRODUCTION
America generates millions of cubic feet of low-level radioactive
waste each year.' The radioactive waste can be extremely dangerous
to humans and must be isolated for long periods of time, often hun-
dreds of years.2 In the late 1970s there were only three radioactive
waste disposal facilities in operation in the United States,3 all of
which were nearing capacity. Recognizing the need to address this
looming shortage of waste disposal facilities, in 1980 Congress enacted
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act ("Act").4 In the Act, Con-
gress declared a federal policy of holding each state "responsible for
providing for the availability of capacity either within or outside the
State for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated within
its borders," and found that such waste could be disposed of "most
safely and efficiently ... on a regional basis."5 Consequently, Con-
gress authorized states to enter into regional compacts that, once rati-
fied by Congress, would have the authority to restrict the use of their
disposal facilities to waste generated by the regional compact-member
states. 6
In 1983, Nebraska formed an Interstate Compact ("Compact") with
Kansas, Arkansas, Oklahoma and Louisiana (collectively, the "party
states") to build a regional disposal site for the low-level radioactive
waste they generated.7 Authority for the Compact derived from the
Act. Each of the five states enacted the Compact as legislations and in
1986 Congress approved the Compact.9 The Compact provided the
framework for licensing a facility for the disposal of low-level radioac-
tive waste generated in the five states.lO Additionally, the Compact
1. See Dan M. Berkovitz, Waste Wars: Did Congress "Nuke" State Sovereignty in the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985?, 11 HARV. ENVrL.
L. REv. 437, 439-40 (1987).
2. See id.
3. These facilities were located in Nevada, Washington, and South Carolina. See id.
at 441.
4. See Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 96-573, 94 Stat. 3347,
§ 4(a)(1) (1980).
5. Id.
6. By passing the Act, Congress essentially allowed states to discriminate in their
acceptance of low-level radioactive waste. Without Congressional approval, such
discrimination would likely violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Arti-
cle IV of the Constitution. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978).
7. See Leslie Reed, Utilities Denied Role in Lawsuit, OmAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug.
30, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Omaha World Herald File.
8. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-3521 (Reissue 1996), repealed by NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 71-3521 to 71-3522 (effective Aug. 28, 1999) (Cum. Sup. 2000).
9. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. II, § 222, 99 Stat. 1859, 1863-71 (1986) (reprinting the
Compact which will hereinafter be cited by article).
10. See id.
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established the Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Com-
mission ("Commission") as the governing body to carry out the Com-
pact's purposes.ii Each party state was represented by one
Commission member who was entitled to one vote.1 2
In December 1987, the Commission, in a four to one vote, chose
Nebraska as the first member state to host a low-level radioactive
waste disposal facility. 13 The Compact required the Commission to
follow the host state's procedures for application of a license before
construction of the waste disposal facility could begin.i4 Conse-
quently, the Commission contracted with US Ecology, Inc. 15 ("USE")
to file a license application for a disposal facility in Nebraska.16 USE
selected a site in Boyd County, Nebraskal7 for the waste disposal fa-
cility and in July 1990 USE submitted a disposal license application to
the state.i8
Almost fifteen years have passed since Nebraska was chosen to
host the waste facility, and not a single ton of radioactive waste from
the other four party states has been disposed in Nebraska. In fact,
there has yet to be a ground breaking for the construction of the pro-
posed Boyd County facility. The delay is attributable to a torturously
slow licensing process (administered by Nebraska agencies) and the
veritable slew of litigation that resulted from it.19 The delays have
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Neighbors Dump on Nebraska, L.A. TimEs, Dec. 15, 1987, at 1.
14. See Compact, art. III(b).
15. US Ecology, Inc. is a California corporation that contracts out to develop, license,
and operate radioactive waste facilities.
16. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2001).
17. Boyd County, Nebraska is a county in North Central Nebraska that borders
South Dakota.
18. See Joint Brief of Appellees at 8, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4265).
19. Over the past eight years there have been no less than six other significant suits
involving the licensing process. See Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Comm'n, 187 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district
court's ruling that the Compact gave the Commission the authority to impose a
reasonable deadline for completion of the licensing review process); Nebraska v.
Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (D.
Neb. 1998) (holding that Nebraska did not have the right to veto an export license
approved by a majority of the Commission); Nebraska ex rel. Nelson v. Centr.
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 902 F. Supp. 1046 (D. Neb.
1995) (holding that Nebraska had no right to have an additional member ap-
pointed to the Commission); County of Boyd v. US Ecology, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 960
(D. Neb. 1994) (holding that Boyd County and its Local Monitoring Committee's
fraud claim against USE regarding community consent were barred by res judi-
cata because of earlier suits brought by Nelson and Nebraska), affd, 48 F.3d 359
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 814 (1995); Nebraska ex rel. Nelson v.
Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 4:CV93-3367, 1993 WL
738576 (D. Neb. Dec. 3, 1993) (holding that Nebraska and Nelson's community
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cost those involved with securing the proposed license tens of millions
of dollars.2 0 Consequently, the Commission, USE, and the generators
of low-level radioactive waste within the party states whose waste will
predominately occupy the new facility (collectively, the "Genera-
tors"), 2 1 are now looking to recover from Nebraska22 those tens of mil-
lions of dollars spent during the licensing process. They have filed
their claims in the United States federal district court in Nebraska
and allege that Nebraska has acted in bad faith by delaying the
processing of (and eventually denying) the application for the Boyd
County waste disposal facility license that the Commission is required
to secure in order to construct and operate the proposed facility.
In its defense, Nebraska claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit. The claim was summarily rejected by the United States
District Court.2 3 The district court determined that Nebraska was not
immune from the suits of the Commission, Generators and USE.24
The Eighth Circuit, in Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska,2 5 upheld
the ruling in regard to the Commission's suit and determined that Ne-
braska, by assenting to the Compact's consent to suit and venue provi-
sions, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from the
Commission. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
order as it pertained to the claims of USE and the Generators, reason-
ing that USE and the Generators were neither a party to, nor a third-
party beneficiary of, the Compact. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit
held that Nebraska did not waive its immunity from the claims of
USE and the Generators.
The Eighth Circuit's decision that Nebraska is not immune from
the Commission's suit could have enormous implications, as Ne-
braska's potential liability, including interest and attorneys' fees,
consent suit was barred by the earlier suit); Nebraska ex rel. Nelson v. Centr.
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 834 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Neb.
1993) (holding that Nebraska and Nelson's claim that community consent was
needed for construction of a waste disposal facility was untimely and barred by
equitable estoppel and laches), affd, 26 F.3d 77 (8th Cir. 1994).
20. See Entergy Ark, Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 978 (D. Neb. 1999).
21. The following entities comprise the Generators: Entergy Arkansas, Inc., Entergy
Gulf State, Inc., Entergy Louisiana, Inc., Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corp.,
and Omaha Public Power District.
22. The Commission is the only party that has a pending direct claim against Ne-
braska, as the Generators' claims against Nebraska have been dismissed. See
Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (D. Neb. 2001). However,
the Generators remain a party to the suit and have equitable subrogation and
cross claims against the Commission.
23. Judge Kopf is the judge assigned to the case.
24. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Neb. 1999) (holding
that Nebraska was not immune from the Commission's suit); Entergy Ark., Inc.
v. Nebraska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Neb. 1999) (holding that Nebraska was not
immune from the Generators and USE's suit).
25. 241 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2001).
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could exceed $160 million. 26 A damages award of this kind would be
crippling to a state's budget anytime, however, its effect would be ex-
acerbated in these tight fiscal times when Nebraska's budget is al-
ready stretched thin.27
This Note will compare Nebraska's Compact to other disputes in-
volving interstate compacts where state sovereign immunity has been
claimed to see whether the Eighth Circuit's decision that Nebraska
waived its immunity to suit from the Commission is consistent with
United States Supreme Court precedent. The Background section will
lay out the history and current state of Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence, as well as document the history of the controversy sur-
rounding the proposed Boyd County waste facility. The Analysis
section will focus on the Eighth Circuit's holding in Entergy Arkansas,
Inc. v. Nebraska, as it pertains to Nebraska's waiver of immunity to
the Commission's claims. Special attention will be paid to the consent
to suit and venue provisions within the Compact, as it is from this
language that a state's waiver of immunity is most often derived. The
Analysis section will also opine that the overwhelming implication of
the Compact's text left no room for the Eighth Circuit to make any
other reasonable interpretation but that the party states, including
Nebraska, had waived their immunity to suits from the Commission
in federal court. While the Eighth Circuit applied the constitutionally
required stringent analysis to the Compact's language, thereby giving
every presumption to non-waiver of sovereign immunity, it was una-
ble to give the Compact's consent to suit provision any meaningful ef-
fect without concluding that the provision subjected Nebraska to suit.
II. BACKGROUND
A. License Application Review Process Begins
Shortly after the selection of Nebraska as host of the waste dispo-
sal facility, the Commission contracted with USE to prepare and sub-
mit a waste disposal license application to Nebraska. Nebraska law
required that USE pay all costs associated with licensing,28 but pursu-
ant to a separate agreement between the Commission and USE the
Commission was to reimburse USE for the licensing costs at a later
date. The Commission subsequently entered into agreements with
26. See Kevin O'Hanlon, Nuclear Waste Legal Bills Mounting, LINcoLN J. STAR, Oct.
16, 2001, at 2.
27. Nebraska faced a tremendous budget shortfall in fiscal year 2001-2002. In Octo-
ber 2001, the governor was required to summon the Nebraska Legislature for a
special session where it had to trim $173 million from the state's budget in order
to meet the tax revenue shortfall. See Robynn Tysver, Johanns, Legislative Com-
mittee Agree on $172 Million in Cuts, OMAHA Woau-HERALD, Nov. 2,2001, at 1A,
available at LEXIS, New Library, Omaha World Herald File.
28. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1579(2) (Reissue 1999).
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the Generators 29 whereby they would fund the Commission for its re-
imbursement costs to USE.30
USE submitted its license application for the waste disposal facil-
ity in July 1990 to two Nebraska agencies, the Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality ("DEQ") and the Department of Health and
Human Services and Licensure ("HHS"). As part of the application
process, DEQ and HHS required USE to answer 700 questions before
it would review the application.
B. New Administration Takes Office
In January 1991, newly elected Nebraska Governor E. Benjamin
Nelson took office. During the election, Nelson promised that if he
were elected, "it is not likely that there will be a nuclear dump in Boyd
County or in Nebraska."31 Nelson made this statement despite Ne-
braska's contractual obligation (pursuant to the Compact) to house the
waste facility. After taking office, Governor Nelson's new administra-
tion appeared to take steps to fulfill the Governor's campaign promise.
Following Nelson's appointment of Randolph Wood as Director of DEQ
in July 1991, Nebraska no longer exchanged information with USE.32
Furthermore, in December 1991, Nebraska stated that it would no
longer accept USE's responses to the 700 questions as they were com-
pleted, but rather would only accept them en masse. Accepting the
questions en masse rather than as they were completed only added to
the time and cost of completing them.
33
In January 1993, following USE's submission of the 700 answers,
DEQ and HHS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the license, citing
drainage problems and the presence of wetlands on the proposed Boyd
County site.34 In response, USE opened a contested case administra-
tive proceeding under Nebraska law to challenge Nebraska's deci-
sion.35 However, USE later withdrew its contest and instead
amended its application for the waste disposal site after reaching a
settlement with Nebraska in which Nebraska pledged to accelerate its
review process.3 6
29. The Generators of the radioactive waste stood to benefit the most from the crea-
tion of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, as such a facility would pro-
vide them a badly needed location to dispose of the great amounts of waste that
they were generating and currently storing themselves.
30. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2001).
31. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981-82 (D. Neb. 1999)
(quoting a public statement made by Nelson).
32. See id. at 982.
33. See id. at 983.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (D. Neb. 1999).
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Nebraska's review process continued following USE's submission
of the amended application. 37 However, in March 1995 the process hit
a significant roadblock when Nebraska directed its primary private
contractor associated with the review of USE's license application to
reduce its billings (and consequently its work on the application re-
view process) by 25 percent.38 Nebraska claimed that there was insuf-
ficient cash flow to pay for its review activities in connection with
USE's application because of the Commission's refusal to advance fed-
erally provided "rebate" funds.39 The rebate funds were provided to
the Commission under federal statute and had been forwarded to Ne-
braska during the review process. 40 The debate over the rebate funds
produced litigation 4 ' that Nebraska and the Commission eventually
settled when Nebraska agreed to accelerate the review process in ex-
change for a portion of the rebate funds.42
USE's application for construction of the waste disposal facility
was complete in June 1995.43 However, DEQ and HHS indicated that
their review of the application would take one more year to com-
plete.44 One year later Nebraska was not close to completing its re-
view.45 Consequently, in September 1996 the Commission imposed a
January 14, 1997 deadline on Nebraska to complete its review of
USE's application.46 Nebraska then sued the Commission in federal
court to have the Commission-imposed deadline lifted. The district
court held, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, that the Commission had
the authority under the Compact to set the deadline.47
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4263).
40. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (D. Neb. 1999). The
rebate funds were provided by the United States Department of Energy from dis-
posal surcharges collected from generators of waste, including the plaintiff-
Generators.
41. Nebraska sued the Commission in federal district court to recover the "rebate"
funds. However, this initiation of suit in federal court by Nebraska in no way
represents a separate waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (stating that the mere appearance of a state in
federal court by the state does not waive its immunity); see also Compact, art.
IV(l) (authorizing party states aggrieved by Commission decisions to obtain judi-
cial review in U.S. District Court).
42. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 983 (D. Neb. 1999).
43. See Brief for Appellants at 8, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4263).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 187
F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 1999).
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DEQ later notified USE that the review would take longer than the
one year time frame earlier indicated because two technical docu-
ments necessary for the review would not be completed until October
of 1997.48 When the technical documents were released by DEQ, they
indicated that USE's proposed Boyd County facility met the site suita-
bility requirements.49 Yet, despite seemingly meeting all of DEQ's
technical site requirements, Nebraska's review of USE's application
continued.o
C. Rejection of License and Ensuing Litigation
In December 1998, over eight years after USE submitted its origi-
nal application, Nebraska denied USE's waste disposal license re-
quest.5 ' Nebraska's reasons for denying the application included an
insufficient water table depth at the proposed Boyd County site,
DEQ's inability under applicable regulations to consider engineered
improvements to the site, and USE's failure to demonstrate financial
ability to build and run the facility.52 USE appealed the denial of its
license application by filing a contested case petition with DEQ in Jan-
uary 1999.53
While USE's contested case petition was pending before DEQ, the
Generators initiated the action that spawned the opinion upon which
this Note is based.54 The Generators, frustrated by the delays in the
Nebraska licensing process and the soaring licensing costs for which
they had contractually agreed to reimburse, asserted claims against
the Commission, Nebraska, and various Nebraska officials and agen-
cies.5 5 Shortly thereafter, USE intervened as a plaintiff and the Com-
mission was realigned from defendant to plaintiff. The primary claim
of every plaintiff was that Nebraska acted in bad faith while denying
USE's application for a license to construct the proposed low-level ra-
dioactive waste disposal facility at the Boyd County site.
56
The Generators and USE sought injunctive and declaratory relief,
removal of state officials from the licensing procedure, an accounting,
and attorneys' fees.57 The Commission sought damages, an account-
ing, declaratory relief, removal of Nebraska from the licensing pro-
cess, and the appointment of an impartial third party to complete the
48. See Brief for Appellants at 9, Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4263).
49. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 984-85 (D. Neb. 1999).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 985.
52. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2001).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1094 (D. Neb. 1999).
57. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2001).
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licensing process.5 8 The Generators and USE also filed an equitable
subrogation cross-claim against the Commission for any damages
award the Commission should receive from Nebraska.
The bad faith claims of the plaintiffs derived both from the Com-
pact's "good faith" provisions and Nebraska's implicit obligation to
perform its Compact obligations in good faith.59 The Compact pro-
vides that "[elach party state has the right to rely on the good faith
performance of each other party state."60 Additionally, the Compact
empowers the Commission to "require the appropriate state or states
... to process all applications for permits and licenses required for the
development and operation of any regional facility or facilities within
a reasonable period from the time that a completed application is sub-
mitted."61 In support of their bad faith claims, the plaintiffs set out
detailed factual allegations alleging that Nebraska and its officials de-
liberately delayed review of USE's license application for eight years
and intended that the process end in denial of the application.6 2 The
facts surrounding these allegations provide compelling evidence that
Nebraska will probably be found liable for acting in bad faith, as the
district court has strongly hinted that the Commission is likely to pre-
vail on its bad faith claims.63
D. Eighth Circuit Holding and its Significance
The Eighth Circuit opinion that is the subject of this Note was a
consolidation of two interlocutory appeals of the district court's denial
of Nebraska's motions seeking Eleventh Amendment immunity and
the dismissal of claims brought by the Commission, the Generators,
and USE.64 The three-judge Eighth Circuit panel carefully weighed
Nebraska's immunity claims and rejected them with regard to the
Commission's suit, but granted Nebraska immunity to the claims of
the Generators and USE reasoning that they were neither parties to,
nor third-party beneficiaries of, the Compact. In denying Nebraska's
motion for dismissal, the court noted that it had already denied Ne-
58. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1094 (D. Neb. 1999).
59. See, e.g., JOHN D. CALAMA-- & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 11.38, at 457-61 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the implicit obligation of good faith
and fair dealing that modem courts apply to contract interpretation).
60. Compact, art. IIH(f).
61. Compact, art. V(e)(2).
62. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2001).
63. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 46 F. Supp. 2d 977, 994 (D. Neb. 1999) (stat-
ing that "[tihe Commission is likely to prevail on the merits" because there has
been a "substantial showing" that Nebraska has acted in bad faith).
64. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming
district court's denial of Nebraska's motion to dismiss Commission's complaint
(68 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Neb. 1999)), but vacating and remanding district court's
denial of Nebraska's motion to dismiss the Generators' complaint (68 F. Supp. 2d
1104 (D. Neb. 1999))).
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braska's Eleventh Amendment immunity claim in a previous prelimi-
nary injunction appeal 65 and held that Nebraska, by assenting to the
Compact's language, waived its immunity from claims by the Commis-
sion, including claims for damages. 6 6 The court partook in a contrac-
tual interpretation of the Compact's language and concluded that "[bly
entering into a compact in which the party states delegated to the
Commission their authority to sue for breach and required the Com-
mission to enforce contractual obligations, Nebraska waived its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity from suit by the Commission in federal
court."6 7 Nebraska petitioned for certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court to review the Eighth Circuit's ruling,68 but the Supreme
Court denied it.69 Consequently, Nebraska remains subject to the
Commission's suit in federal court for claims arising under the Com-
pact. The district court is set to hear opening arguments regarding the
Commission's bad faith claims against Nebraska on June 3, 2002.70
The Commission's claims pose an enormous threat to Nebraska's
treasury.7 1 The ramifications of the Eighth Circuit's decision are sig-
nificant not only for the State of Nebraska and its citizens, who will
ultimately be responsible for paying any money judgment to the Com-
mission, but also for other states that have entered into similar com-
pacts.72 Furthermore, the court's decision that Nebraska waived its
sovereign immunity and consented to suit by the Commission in fed-
eral court affects the fundamental constitutional balance between the
federal government and the states.7 3 Consequently, this Note's analy-
65. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
66. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating
that "[w]e carefully considered the Eleventh Amendment issue before deciding it
in the course of the preliminary injunction appeal, and our holding that Nebraska
waived its immunity from claims by the Commission, including claims for dam-
ages, is now the law of the case.") (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 988.
68. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001), petition for cert.
filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 2863 (U.S. July 17, 2001) (No. 01-87).
69. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub
nom., Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 122
S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.) (No. 01-87).
70. The trial is scheduled to last seven weeks and will be a bench trial. See Entergy
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, No. 4:98CV3411, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3002 (D. Neb.
Feb. 22, 2002).
71. See O'Hanlon, supra note 26, at 2.
72. There are ten other low-level radioactive waste compacts that have been enacted
in accordance with federal law. These compacts include the vast majority of the
states, however, none of them have enforcement mechanism provisions compara-
ble to Nebraska's Compact. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certio-
rari at 21-22 n.1, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied sub nom. Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.) (No. 01-87).
73. See e.g., Delmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (stating that the loss of a
state's sovereign immunity can upset "the fundamental constitutional balance be-
2001]
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sis will focus on the Eighth Circuit's holding that by entering into the
Compact, Nebraska waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to
suits by the Commission in federal court.74
E. Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens of any Foreign State."7 5
The Eleventh Amendment was enacted in reaction to the ill-re-
ceived Chisholm v. Georgia76 decision, in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear a claim against
Georgia brought by a citizen of South Carolina. Many abhorred the
Court's position in Chisholm that a citizen could bring an action
against a state in federal court. 77 The general sentiment among the
states was that the Court was encroaching upon the sovereignty of the
states.7 8 Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment was proposed and
ratified within five years of the decision.79
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
has been inconsistent and fragmented.8 0 Read literally, the Eleventh
Amendment would appear to only bar suits against states brought by
citizens of other states or citizens of foreign countries. However, the
Court has construed the Amendment much more broadly than the
text,8 1 and has interpreted the Amendment as providing states with
tween the Federal Government and the States" (quoting Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985))).
74. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing En-
tergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000)).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
76. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Supreme Court reasoned that the sovereign im-
munity of the states was qualified by the general jurisdiction provisions of Article
HI.
77. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1977); see also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA
& JOHN F. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONsTITuTIONAL LAV: SuBsTANcE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2.12 (2d ed. 2000).
78. See RoTUNDA & NovAx, supra note 77, § 2.12; Field, supra note 77, at 520-23.
79. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 77, § 2.12.
80. See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 224 (1989) (5-4 decision); Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66 (1995) (5-4 decision); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235 (1985) (5-4 decision); Parden v. Terminal Ry.
Of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (5-4 decision), overruled in part by
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987) (plu-
rality opinion); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 283
(1959) (5-3 decision).
81. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans is the seminal case marking the
Supreme Court's extra-textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In
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an expansive right of sovereign immunity that is based in principles
that are fundamental to the constitutional design.8 2 Despite a lack of
textual foundation, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted as
providing states immunity from suits from broader constituencies
than those indicated within the text of the Amendment.8 3 This broad
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment has been termed by one
scholar as "nontextual originalism" because the Court has looked be-
yond the text of the Amendment to the backdrop of sovereign immu-
nity principles that were said to be well-accepted and presumed by the
Founding Fathers.84 This extra-textual approach of the Court has
been the source of much criticism.8 5 However, the approach helps ex-
plain the elasticity of the Court's interpretations of the Amendment
throughout history.86
The seminal case for the Court's expansive interpretation of states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity is Hans v. Louisiana.87 In Hans, a
Louisiana citizen brought suit against that state in federal court seek-
ing damages for the value of bonds that Louisiana had issued but later
repudiated.8 8 A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment, despite the seemingly narrow scope of its language,
barred suits against states in federal courts by their own citizens.8 9
Hans, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment, by implication, also bars
suits by citizens of the defendant state.
82. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999) (stating that "[tihe Eleventh
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a consti-
tutional principle; it follows that the scope of the States' immunity from suit is
demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental postu-
lates implicit in the constitutional design.")
83. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92.
84. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1345 (1989).
85. For articles supporting the view that the Eleventh Amendment was drafted for
narrow construction, see William A.- Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1261 (1989); William
A- Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. 1 (1988). See also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299,
309-10 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the proper interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment is a literal interpretation that limits states' im-
munity to suits from citizens of other states or foreign countries only). For
articles endorsing a more expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
see Marshall, supra note 84; William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HIv. L. Rzv. 1372 (1989).
86. See ROTuNDA & NowAx, supra note 77, § 2.12.
87. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
88. See id. at 1-3.
89. See id.
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The only exception to this rule noted by the Court was if the state had
waived its immunity.9 0
Hans provided the Court the essential bridge to extend states' sov-
ereign immunity beyond the textual landscape of the Eleventh
Amendment. In addition to barring suits against states by their own
citizens, the Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits
against states that are brought by foreign states9 i and Indian
tribes.92 Furthermore, the Court has held that states retain their sov-
ereign immunity regardless of whether the suit is in state or federal
court, falls under diversity or federal question jurisdiction, or whether
the suit is brought in admiralty, as opposed to law or equity.93
F. Recognized Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment
Immunity
Despite the Court's expansive interpretation of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity in the aforementioned instances, the Court has also
shown a willingness to curtail the scope of Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. For instance, the Court has held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar states from initiating actions against other states.9 4
The Court has also held that the Amendment does not preclude suits
by the federal government against states. 95 Furthermore, the Court
has recognized that the Eleventh Amendment does not interfere with
Congress' authority to abrogate state immunity from suit under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 96 nor does the Amendment cir-
90. See id.
91. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999); Principality of Monaco v. Mis-
sissippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
92. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254; Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775 (1991).
93. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254; Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
94. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 315-21 (1904); Rhode Island v.
Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657 (1838).
95. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644 (1892).
96. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Congress has Section 5 abrogation
authority because "the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at
the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state
and federal power struck by the Constitution." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996). However, more recent cases dealing with Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment indicate that Congress's abrogation power may have a
more narrow reach. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000) (hold-
ing Age Discrimination in Employment Act not validly enacted under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment because its provisions did not comport with Equal
Protection Clause protections against age discrimination and because Congress
did not identify a pattern of state bias against workers based on age); Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224-25
(1999) (holding Lanham Act not validly enacted pursuant to Section 5 of Four-
teenth Amendment because freedom from false advertising by a competitor and
security of business were not "property" under the Due Process Clause); Fla. Pre-
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cumscribe the Court's appellate jurisdiction over federal question
cases originating from state court.9
7
Another example of the Court's curtailment of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity was the court's ruling in Ex parte Young9 8 that
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for prospective relief
brought by individuals in federal court against state officials who vio-
lated federal law while acting within the scope of their duties. In Ex
parte Young, stockholders in a railroad company brought an injunctive
suit in federal court against the Minnesota State Attorney General for
attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law.99 The Court based its
decision to enjoin the Attorney General from enforcing the unconstitu-
tional law on a fiction that because a state officer could not be given
authority to violate federal law, the suit was not against the state it-
self so the Eleventh Amendment did not apply.lOO
Ex parte Young marked a significant crack in the broad immunity
shield the Eleventh Amendment had provided states for over a cen-
tury. After Ex parte Young, state officials could no longer rely upon
their state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to shield them from eq-
uity suits in federal court.lo' However, it should be noted that claims
brought under the Exparte Young theory are limited in that they only
allow for prospective relief and thus preclude the recovery of money
damages.
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207
(1999) (holding Patent and Plant Protection Remedy Clarification Act not validly
enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in part because
"Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a
pattern of constitutional violations"); City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(finding Freedom of Restoration Act surpassed Congress's power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it fundamentally altered constitutional
rights and thus was not remedial in nature).
97. See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 26-27
(1990); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821). However, a state can prevent the initial private suit from
being commenced by relying on state common law immunity principles, state con-
stitutional prohibitions, or state regulatory restrictions. These state law restric-
tions are particularly important in light of Alden, where the Court made clear
that Congress cannot abrogate a state's immunity in its own state courts with
regard to private party claims brought under federal law.
98. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
99. See id. at 131.
100. See ROTuNDA & NowAy, supra note 77, § 2.12.
101. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974) (explaining that under Exparte
Young, a government official was not immune from a federal action based on a
constitutional violation).
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G. Consent to Suit and the Waiver Doctrine
Like other constitutional rights and privileges,' 02 it has long been
recognized that a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity at its pleasure.03 The state's decision to waive its immu-
nity is completely voluntary 04 and the test for determining whether a
state has waived its immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a
stringent onei 05 that is to be applied by federal court judges.i 06 Fed-
eral judges are to "indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver" when interpreting whether a state has waived its sovereign
immunity.107
The conclusion that a state has consented or waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suit has traditionally not lightly been
drawn.1OS The U.S. Supreme Court has stringently scrutinized lan-
guage that has been alleged to constitute a state's waiver to suit in
federal court.i 09 General consent to suit provisions will not suffice to
constitute waiver of a state's sovereign immunity in federal court.iio
Instead, general consent to suit provisions will be narrowly construed
to only encompass the state waiving its immunity in state court, as
opposed to federal.11 As such, a state does not submit to lower fed-
eral court jurisdiction by consenting to suit in its own courts,"i 2 by
stating its willingness to "sue and be sued," 3 or even by authorizing
suits against it in "any court of competent jurisdiction."1i4 Perhaps
the Court's best expression of its test for states' waiver of Eleventh
102. Other waivable constitutional rights include the right to a jury trial in a criminal
trial, the right to confront one's accuser in criminal trial, and the due process
rights attached to personal jurisdiction.
103. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2226 (1990) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
104. See id. at 2226.
105. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
106. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981) (stating that "the construction of
an interstate agreement sanctioned by Congress under the Compact Clause
presents a federal question").
107. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
108. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241; Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54
(1944).
109. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241 (stating that the "test for determining whether a
State has waived its immunity from federal-court jurisdiction is a stringent one").
110. See id. (stating that general consent to suit provision did not waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity because the "provision does not specifically indicate the
State's willingness to be sued in federal court").
111. See Great Northern, 322 U.S. at 54 (stating that "[w]hen a state authorizes a suit
against itself..., it is not consonant with our dual system for the federal courts
to be astute to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts").
112. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900).
113. See Fla. Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S.
147, 149 (1981) (per curium).
114. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 578 (1946).
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Amendment sovereign immunity was provided in Edelman v. Jor-
dan1 1 5 where the Court said that "[in deciding whether a State has
waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment,
we will find waiver only where stated by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no
room for any other reasonable construction."
i 16
Prior to Edelman, such explicitness was not a prerequisite for
waiver of state immunity. In Pardon v. Terminal Railway,117 the
Court ruled that employees of a railroad owned and operated by Ala-
bama could sue the state for damages under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA) despite the absence of any provision within the
FELA statutory language referring to federal court jurisdiction over
the states."i8 The Court held that Alabama had constructively
waived its sovereign immunity to claims that arose by virtue of its
operation of a railroad in interstate commerce.'1 9 The Parden deci-
sion marked the first enunciation of what has been termed the con-
structive or implied waiver doctrine. The constructive or implied
waiver doctrine allowed courts to infer a state's waiver of sovereign
immunity from its actions, as opposed to an express, unequivocal stat-
ute or a statute where the overwhelming implication of the language
leaves no room for any other reasonable interpretation but a state's
consent to suit. However, the Parden decision, like many of the Su-
preme Court's Eleventh Amendment decisions, was a sharply divided
5-4 decision.i 20
In the years following Parden, the Court refused to extend the con-
structive waiver doctrine to different fact patternsi 21 and began to re-
treat from the constructive waiver doctrine altogether.3122 For
example, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,1 23 the majority held
that a state statute or constitutional provision had to specifically indi-
cate "the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court" in
order for it to be determined that a state waived its immunity. 2 4 It
was argued by the plaintiffs in Atascadero that California waived its
immunity to suit in federal court when it adopted language in its state
115. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
116. Id. at 673 (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
117. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
118. See id.
119. See id. at 192.
120. For other sharply divided Eleventh Amendment opinions, see cases cited supra
note 80.
121. See Employees of Dept. of Pub. Health and Welfare ofMo. v. Dep't of Pub. Health
and Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
122. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2227 (1999) (commenting that nine years after the Parden decision the
Court began to retreat from the constructive waiver doctrine).
123. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
124. Id. at 241.
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constitution which stated that "[s]uits may be brought against the
State in such a manner and in such courts as shall be directed by
law."'125 The Court, however, did not agree with the plaintiffs and
held that a general waiver of immunity, such as the waiver in Califor-
nia's state constitution, was not enough to subject a state to a suit in
federal court, but was only sufficient to subject a state to suit in state
court.1
2 6
After several decades of decisions limiting the constructive waiver
doctrine in actions involving Eleventh Amendment immunity claims,
the Court, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,127 took the dramatic step of completely re-
jecting the "constructive-waiver experiment."12s In completely re-
jecting the constructive waiver doctrine, the Court was emphatic in
stating that a state's waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivo-
cal.129 According to the Court, a state must provide a "clear declara-
tion" of its waiver to suit in order for it to lose its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suits in federal court.' 30 The Court's de-
cision to expressly renounce the constructive or implied waiver doc-
trine has further insulated states from being subjected to suit in
federal court and has thus further fortified states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity.
H. Congress's Abrogation of State Immunity
Throughout its history, Congress has had varying degrees of power
to abrogate state immunity through legislative action.' 3 ' Currently,
the only recognized circumstance under which Congress's power to ab-
rogate states' immunity is permitted is under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.13 2 On occasion, the Court has also found that
Congress' Article I commerce and spending powers enabled Congress
to legislatively abrogate state immunity and provide for private rights
125. See id. at 241 (citing CAL. CONST. art. HI, § 5).
126. See id. at 241 (finding that California did not waive its immunity to suit in fed-
eral court because the statutory language did not expressly and specifically waive
the state's immunity in federal courts).
127. 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
128. Id. at 2228 (stating that "[wie think that the constructive-waiver experiment of
Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant
of it").
129. See id.
130. See Coll. Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2228.
131. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not impair Congress's ability to authorize private suits against
states under its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers).
132. See ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 77, § 2.12 (stating that normal federal court
Eleventh Amendment jurisdictional rules do not limit Congress' power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment upon the states).
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of action against states.133 However, this proposition that Article I
powers enable Congress to abrogate state immunity from private suit
was rejected by the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida134
when the Court held that the commerce and spending powers con-
ferred by Article I provide Congress no authority to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity. 3 5
Abrogation analysis is fundamentally different from waiver analy-
sis in that abrogation concerns congressional authority, whereas
waiver deals exclusively with a state's voluntary relinquishment of its
right to immunity from suit. During the era when Congress's author-
ity to regulate under Article I was virtually unlimited, there was
hardly any distinction between abrogation and waiver analyses, as
both applied a comparable solicitude for states' sovereign immu-
nity.13 6 However, as the Court has curtailed congressional authority
during the past decade,13 7 the two analyses have diverged somewhat.
For example, in Seminole Tribe the Court held that Article I did not
provide Congress authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity to
suit in federal court.13 s Shortly thereafter the Court went a step fur-
ther in Alden v. Maine1 3 9 when it held that Congress, in addition to
not being able to abrogate states' sovereign immunity in federal courts
under Article I, could not do so in state courts as well.140 As Seminole
Tribe and Alden illustrate, Congress's ability to abrogate sovereign
immunity has diminished with the Court's curtailment of congres-
133. The most notable example of an Article I power that the Court had found to en-
able Congress to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is the Com-
merce Power. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that
a congressionally passed environmental statute that was enacted under Con-
gress'commerce power subjected states to liability for the costs of cleaning up
hazardous waste).
134. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
135. See id. at 76 (holding that the Eleventh Amendment imposes a constitutional
limit on federal jurisdiction that Congress may not ignore when enforcing Article
I legislation against the states).
136. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (explain-
ing that the standard employed for abrogation analysis is similar to that em-
ployed for waiver analysis).
137. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (finding the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act unconstitutional insofar as it required state law enforce-
ment officers perform background checks because Congress cannot compel state
executive officials to implement a federal regulatory scheme); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 un-
constitutional because Congress surpassed its commerce power by regulating gun
possession, which does not substantially affect interstate commerce).
138. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 (stating that "Article I cannot be used to cir-
cumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction").
139. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
140. See id. at 754 (stating that "the States retain immunity from private suit in their
own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I
legislation").
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sional authority. In contrast, the Court's waiver analysis has been un-
affected by the Court's curtailment of congressional powers, as waiver
analysis focuses on the unrelated issue of state sovereignty.
Although the Compact is technically federal law,' 4 i the Eighth
Circuit correctly applied waiver analysis to Nebraska's sovereign im-
munity claim, as the Compact was essentially a contract between Ne-
braska and the party states.' 4 2 While an argument could be made for
the application of an abrogation analysis to Nebraska's claim, the
waiver analysis is better suited, as Congress simply sanctioned the
Compact and had no intent to abrogate the party states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. In College Savings Bank, the Court stated
that sovereign immunity cases involving interstate Compacts are
"fundamentally different" from cases involving Congress's use of its
Article I powers to extract constructive waivers of states' sovereign
immunity.' 43 The Court noted that Congress's granting of consent of
interstate compacts is merely a gratuity and is not comparable to an
affirmative exercise of congressional power. Thus, the Eighth's Cir-
cuit's application of a waiver analysis to the Compact, as opposed to
an abrogation analysis, was appropriate.' 44
III. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit's holding that Nebraska waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suits from the Commission in federal court,
even suits for damages, is in line with United States Supreme Court
141. See Omnibus Low-Level Radioactive Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act,
Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. II, § 222, 99 Stat. 1859, 1863-71 (1986).
142. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating
that "[a] Compact between states is 'after all a contract .... It remains a legal
document that must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms....
There is nothing in the nature of compacts generally ... that counsels against
rectifying a failure to perform in the past as well as ordering future performance
called for by the Compact.'" (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128
(1987)).
143. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2231 (1999).
144. Although Seminole Tribe significantly restricted the use of the abrogation of sov-
ereign immunity, the case law suggests that abrogation could be a viable argu-
ment in sovereign immunity disputes that involve congressionally sanctioned
interstate compacts. In College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority, stated that the Compact Clause is "fundamentally different" from other
Article I abrogation cases because the states "cannot form an interstate compact
without first obtaining the express consent of Congress." Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231 (1999). Despite
Justice Scalia's intimation about Congress's authority to abrogate under the
Compact Clause, the waiver analysis is better suited for the Commission's claims
because the Compact is essentially a contract between the party states, as they
were the entities to negotiate and draft it.
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precedent14 5 and entirely appropriate given the Compact's consent to
suit and venue provisions.146 The Compact's consent to suit and
venue provisions provide an overwhelming implication that the Com-
pact's party states intended for the Commission to have the authority
to enforce the Compact against breaching or non-complying party
states in the lower federal courts.' 4 7 The Compact was entered into
by the states to address the dreadful and potentially disastrous na-
tional shortage of waste disposal facilities for low-level radioactive
waste.148 Given the severity of the disposal facility shortage and the
considerable time and expense that was involved in negotiating and
enacting the Compact,' 4 9 it is doubtful that the party states intended
to draft an essentially meaningless enforcement mechanism within
the Compact. Consequently, broad consent to suit and venue provi-
sions were incorporated within the Compact that were intended to en-
compass the lower federal courts.5o Additionally, the party states
created an administrative vehicle, the Commission, to oversee the
Compact's objectives and granted it the authority to enforce the Com-
pact's provisions.15' Given the circumstances in which the Compact
was created and the language the Compact employed, the Eighth Cir-
cuit could not help but conclude that Nebraska waived its immunity to
suit from the Commission in federal court when it entered the
Compact.15
2
The Eighth Circuit employed the constitutionally required strin-
gent analysis to the Compact language.' 53 This stringent analysis
presumes that a state does not waive its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity unless there is an overwhelming implication from the textual lan-
guage that provides no room for any other reasonable construction but
waiver.15 4 Unfortunately for Nebraska, the Compact's language left
no other reasonable construction but that it, and the other party
145. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 170-174.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 192-201.
148. See Compact, art. I.
149. The Compact itself is a long, carefully drafted document containing nine separate
articles that took years to negotiate.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 170-174.
151. See Compact, art. IV(a).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 220-228.
153. The stringent analysis is required for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
claims because the submission of the states to suit in federal court threatens to
upset "the fundamental constitutional balance between the Federal Government
and the States.'" See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989) (quoting Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985)).
154. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,
673 (1974)).
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states, waived their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by en-
tering the Compact.155
A. An Interstate Compact Is a "Creature of Federal Law"156
Interstate compacts are essentially congressionally sanctioned con-
tracts between the states, as a compact is "a contract.., that must be
construed and applied in accordance with its terms."'5 7 The construc-
tion of interstate compacts that are sanctioned by Congress pursuant
to the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution 5 8 presents a federal
question that is within the purview of the federal judiciary.' 59 The
meaning of a compact is a question over which the Supreme Court of
the United States has the final say,160 as compacts are federal law by
virtue of being congressionally sanctioned agreements. 16 ' Conse-
quently, interpretation of compact language presents a federal ques-
tion by which federal courts can exercise jurisdiction.' 6 2
The Central Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact en-
tered into by Nebraska meets the constitutional requirements for a
compact under the Compact Clause because Congress officially sanc-
tioned the Compact vis-&-vis the Ominbus Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act163 and because Nebraska and
the four other states assented to the Compact through their legislative
enactment of the Compact.' 64 These legislative acts by Congress and
the party states validated the Compact and made it binding upon the
assenting party states. However, the issue of this case is not whether
the Compact is binding, as all parties have conceded that it is,165 but
rather what remedial or enforcement mechanisms are available to the
Commission when a party state breaches the Compact or is in non-
compliance with it. Specifically, the issue is whether the lower federal
155. See supra text accompanying notes 170 through 174.
156. The Eighth Circuit first stated that the Compact is a "creature of federal law" in
County of Boyd v. US Ecology, Inc., 48 F.3d 359, 361 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted).
157. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
159. See Del. River Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940).
160. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951).
161. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985).
162. See State ex rel. Nelson v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Comm'n, 834 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Neb. 1993) (asserting that federal courts
have federal question jurisdiction over interpretation of interstate compacts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
163. Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. H, § 222, 99 Stat. 1859, 1863 (1986).
164. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1579 (Reissue 1999).
165. Neither Nebraska, the Generators, the Commission, nor USE dispute the validity
of the Compact. See generally Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 2001).
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courts have authority to exercise jurisdiction166 over a party state de-
fendant (e.g., Nebraska) when sued by a Compact-created entity (e.g.,
the Commission).
B. The Eighth Circuit's Waiver Analysis in Regard to the
Compact
The central issue in Nebraska's immunity claim is whether Ne-
braska waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by enter-
ing into the Compact.16 7 Determining whether Nebraska waived itsimmunity to suit depends entirely upon a stringent interpretation of
the Compact language. The Eighth Circuit, in finding that Nebraska
waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, recognized the
need for a stringent analysis with respect to determining if Nebraska
waived its immunity to suit in federal court. It stated that "[a] waiver
of immunity occurs when a state makes a clear declaration of its in-
tention to submit to suit in federal court as evidenced by the language
of the text or an overwhelming implication from the text as will leave
no room for any other reasonable construction."'
6 8 Applying this
stringent analysis and presumption against waiver, the Eighth Cir-
cuit found that the language of the Compact "authorizes, and indeed
requires, the Commission to enforce the obligations it imposes upon
party states" in federal district court.16
9
The relevant language of the Compact the Eighth Circuit relied
upon for purposes of its waiver analysis is contained within the Com-
pact's consent to suit clause:1
7 0
"The Commission shall ... require all party states and other persons to per-
form their duties and obligations arising under this compact by an appropri-
ate action in any forum designated in section e. of Article iV."171
166. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 77, § 2.12. While it is customary to refer to
the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar, it should not be confused with
the types ofjurisdiction conferred by Article I, such as diversity or federal ques-
tion jurisdiction. A state can waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, whereas
parties cannot waive the requirement of Article Im jurisdiction.
167. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); Entergy
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d, 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2000). Nebraska's sovereign
immunity claim could also be characterized as one of abrogation, as the Compact
was also enacted as a piece of federal legislation. See Omnibus Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. 11, § 222,
99 Stat. 1859, 1865 (1986). However, it is more appropriate to characterize the
issue as waiver as Nebraska passed the identical bill in the Nebraska Unicam-
eral. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-3521 (Reissue 1996), repealed by NEB. Rav. STAT.
§ 71-3522 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (effective Aug. 28, 1999).
168. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation and
quotations omitted).
169. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
170. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); Entergy
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2000).
171. Compact, art. IV(m)(8).
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Article IV(e), referred to by the consent to suit clause, designates
the forum in which the Commission may enforce the obligations of the
parties which provides:
The Commission may initiate any proceedings or appear as an intervenor or
party in interest before any court of law, or any Federal, state or local agency,
board or Commission that has jurisdiction over any matter arising under or
relating to the terms of the provisions of this compact. The Commission shall
determine in which proceedings it shall intervene or otherwise appear and
may arrange for such expert testimony, reports, evidence or other participa-
tion in such proceedings as may be necessary to represent its views.
1 7 2
The Eighth Circuit centered its waiver analysis on these two provi-
sions. Nebraska, on the other hand, pointed to different language
within the Compact to support its position that the state did not waive
its sovereign immunity by entering into the Compact. One such provi-
sion provides:
The Commission may, by two-thirds affirmative vote of its membership, re-
voke the membership of any party state which, after notice and hearing, shall
be found to have arbitrarily or capriciously denied or delayed the issuance of a
license or permit to any person authorized by the Commission to apply for
such license or permit.
1 7 3
In another section, the Compact provides: "Any party state which
fails to comply with the terms of this compact or fulfill its obligations
hereunder, may, after notice and hearing, have its privileges sus-
pended or its membership in the compact revoked by the
Commission."'174
Nebraska contended that the above provisions provided the exclu-
sive remedy for the Commission against breaching or non-complying
party states.175 Consequently, Nebraska argued that if revocation or
suspension of membership was the exclusive remedy the Commission
had in regard to breaching party states, then the member states re-
tained their sovereign immunity rights against the Commission.
The Eighth Circuit was not convinced by Nebraska's exclusive
remedy argument.17 6 The Eighth Circuit noted that "[niothing in the
Compact states that revocation or suspension of the states' member-
ship is the exclusive enforcement mechanism."' 7 7 Instead, the Eighth
Circuit agreed with the Commission's argument that the Compact
language demonstrated Nebraska's waiver of sovereign immunity. 7 8
Interpreting the consent to suit and venue clauses together, the court
172. Compact, art. IV(e).
173. Compact, art. V(g).
174. Compact, art. VII(e).
175. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 896 (8th Cir. 2000).
176. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); Entergy
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
177. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
178. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001); Entergy
Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2000).
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found that the party states (including Nebraska) waived their Elev-
enth Amendment immunity from suit by the Commission in federal
court because they delegated to the Commission their authority to sue
for breach of the Compact and required the Commission to enforce
each party state's Compact obligations.iV9 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that "[bly entering into [the Compact], Nebraska waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by the Commission in fed-
eral court."' 8 0
C. Nebraska's Criticism of the Eighth Circuit Decision
Nebraska has argued that the Eighth Circuit utilized a lower stan-
dard than is required in deciding when a state has waived its Elev-
enth Amendment sovereign immunity when it found that Nebraska
consented to suit by the Commission in federal court by assenting to
the Compact.' 8 ' Nebraska claimed that the Eighth Circuit broke en-
trenched Supreme Court precedent and inferred that Nebraska
waived its sovereign immunity by entering into the Compact.' 8 2 Ne-
braska and twelve amici curiae states 8 3 maintained that the Eighth
Circuit had applied the rejected constructive waiver doctrine whereby
a court construes that a state waived its Eleventh Amendment sover-
eign immunity in a less than explicit manner.18 4 The constructive
waiver doctrine, as was indicated earlier,' 8 5 was completely rejected
by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank as a rationale for con-
struing a state's waiver of its sovereign immunity.'8 6 Nebraska and
the amici curiae states' basis for arguing that the Eighth Circuit in
fact applied the constructive waiver theory in its decision is that no-
where in the Compact do the party states expressly consent to suit in
179. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241,F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2001).
180. Id.
181. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10-24, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Ne-
braska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nebraska v. Centr.
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.)
(No. 01-87).
182. See id.
183. Twelve states (Alaska, California, Florida, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
tana, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and West Virginia) submitted
a brief of amici curiae to the U.S. Supreme Court supporting Nebraska's position
that the Eighth Circuit broke from entrenched precedent in holding that Ne-
braska had waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Brief of
Amid Curiae States, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979 (8th Cir.
2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.) (No. 01-87).
184. See id. at 1-6.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 126-131.
186. See Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct.
2219, 2227-28 (1999).
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
federal court.18 7 Thus, the argument goes, since there is no explicit
consent to federal suit provision within the Compact, the only way for
the Eighth Circuit to derive such consent is either by interpreting Ne-
braska's entry into the Compact as a constructive waiver or by apply-
ing an inappropriately loose canon of statutory constructionl 8S to the
Compact's consent to suit and venue provisions.
Nebraska argued that the Eighth Circuit impugned a "core consti-
tutional protection" by expansively construing the Compact's consent
to suit provision's reference to "any court of law" as encompassing fed-
eral court.18 9 And in so doing, Nebraska contended that the Eighth
Circuit violated one of the basic principles of federalism-the sover-
eignty of the states.190 According to Nebraska, immunity from suit is
"a fundamental aspect of sovereignty which the States enjoyed before
the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today."1 91
Thus, by subjecting an "unconsenting" state to suit in federal district
court, Nebraska asserted that the Eighth Circuit had disrupted the
fundamental balance of federalisml92 that the Constitution requires.
D. Eighth Circuit Waiver Analysis On Point
Although it is understandable for Nebraska to be displeased with
the Eighth Circuit's holding that it waived its immunity,19 3 the
Eighth Circuit's waiver analysis was on point in two respects. First,
the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the Compact's language was consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's analysis of other interstate compacts
where a state's consent to suit in the lower federal courts has been
disputed.194 Precedent required the Eighth Circuit to interpret the
187. See Brief of Amici Curiae States at 1-3, Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Comm'n (No. 01-87).
188. Nebraska essentially argues that the canon of statutory construction to be ap-
plied is that qualifying or limiting words or clauses (e.g., "federal") are only to be
applied to the next preceding antecedent. Whereas, the Commission would
counter that this rule of construction should not be applied when an evident
sense and meaning require a different construction. See generally Karl N. Llew-
ellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAD. L. REv. 395 (1950).
189. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-13, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241
F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.) (No. 01-87).
190. See id.
191. See id. at 12.
192. For an excellent analysis of the fundamental balance of federalism, see Larry D.
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
193. Nebraska is after all on the hook for potentially over $160 million.
194. There are three U.S. Supreme Court cases that are instructive in determining
what effect the Compact had on Nebraska's Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 41-42 (1994)
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Compact's consent to suit provisions stringently.195 However, prece-
dent also allowed the Eighth Circuit to use other textual evidence
(e.g., venue selection clauses) within the Compact to resolve any ambi-
guity in the consent to suit provision.196 Although the state's waiver
should be express, a court is entitled to interpret waiver when the
overwhelming implication of the text leaves no room for any other rea-
sonable construction.1
97
Secondly, the Eighth Circuit's analysis was on point because inter-
preting the Compact's venue and consent to suit language any other
way than it did would render those provisions essentially meaning-
less.' 98 If the Compact did not entitle the Commission to bring suit in
the lower federal courts as Nebraska had argued, there would be no
other reasonable judicial venue to resolve disputes between the Com-
mission and the party states. 199 Given that Nebraska's interpretation
of the Compact would provide no reasonable judicial venue to settle
disputes, its interpretation would be contrary to the traditional princi-
ple that for every right there must be a remedy, 200 in that the Com-
pact would create rights for the Commission, yet according to
Nebraska, the Commission would have no reasonable judicial forum to
enforce those rights.201
(explaining that states agreed to federal courts having authority to hear disputes
involving Compact Clause entities by virtue of the federal plan prescribed by the
Constitution); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 306-07
(1990) (allowing for other textual evidence of consent to suit in federal courts to
resolve ambiguities that arise in the interpretation of interstate compacts); Petty
v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1959) (stating that
when interpreting waiver from interstate compacts, federal courts are "called on
to interpret not unilateral state action but the terms of a consensual agreement,
the meaning of which, because made by different States acting under the Consti-
tution and with congressional approval, is a question of federal law"). The most
analogous case involving interstate compacts would have to be Feeney. See text
accompanying notes 202-213.
195. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
196. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2000) (consid-
ering both the Compact's consent to suit and venue clausei when determining
whether Nebraska had waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity);
see also Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306-07 (allowing for other textual evidence of consent
to suit in federal courts to resolve ambiguities that arise in the interpretation of
interstate compacts).
197. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
198. Nebraska presented the Eighth Circuit essentially the same question that Feeney
presented the Supreme Court. That is, asking the court to choose between giving
the Compact's venue provision its natural meaning and giving the provision no
meaning at all. See Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Comm'n., 187 F.3d 982, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1999); Feeney, 495 U.S. at 308.
199. State courts would not be a reasonable venue because of their inherent bias. See
supra note 220.
200. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
201. The Eleventh Amendment has taken sharp criticism for restricting rights in
favor of the states' sovereignty. Justice Stevens has noted that "expansive Elev-
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The Eighth Circuit interpreted the Compact's language in a man-
ner consistent with precedent. The most analogous case involving in-
terpretation of an interstate compact's language for waiver of
sovereign immunity purposes came in Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corp. v. Feeney.2 02 In Feeney, an employee of a railroad owned by the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey brought an action against
the railroad pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
other related federal statutes. The Port Authority, an entity created
by a bi-state compact between New York and New Jersey,2 03 claimed
Eleventh Amendment immunity against Feeney's suit.
The Court looked principally to the Port Authority's statutory con-
sent to suit provisions enacted by New Jersey and New York for deter-
mination of whether the states had waived the Port Authority's
immunity from suit.204 The consent to suit provision provided that
New York and New Jersey "consent to suits, actions, or proceedings of
any form or nature at law, in equity or otherwise ... against the Port
of New York Authority."205 The Court, sensitive to the state sover-
eignty values underlying the Eleventh Amendment, noted that the
consent to suit provision standing alone would be insufficient to waive
Eleventh Amendment immunity, as the provision was ambiguous to
the extent it was not clear whether the provision encompassed suit in
only state court or whether the provision included both state and fed-
eral court.20 6
In order to resolve the consent to suit provision's ambiguity, the
Court sought other textual evidence within the compact. Relying
enth Amendment jurisprudence is not merely misguided as a matter of constitu-
tional law; it is also an engine of injustice," as it precludes individuals from a
judicial forum to enforce their rights against states. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 54
(Stevens, J., concurring).
202. 495 U.S. 299 (1990). Though Feeney was decided nine years before College Sav-
ings Bank, College Savings Bank has little effect on the underlying Feeney rea-
soning because the majority explicitly distinguished those cases involving
interstate Compacts. The Court stated that sovereign immunity cases involving
interstate Compacts are "fundamentally different" from cases involving Con-
gress's use of its Article I powers to extract constructive waivers of states' sover-
eign immunity. The Court noted that Congress's granting of consent to
interstate compacts is merely a gratuity and is not comparable to an affirmative
exercise of Congressional power. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999).
203. The fact that the Port Authority was not a state was irrelevant to the Court's
waiver analysis as the Court assumed arguendo that the suit against the Port
Authority was one against the individual states of New York and New Jersey.
See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 304-05 (citing Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959)).
204. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306-07.
205. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-157 (West 1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7101 (Mc-
Kinney 1979).
206. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 306.
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upon other provisions found within the Port Authority compact, spe-
cifically the compact's venue provision, the Court held that the con-
sent to suit provision extended to suit in federal court.20 7 The Court
relied upon the venue provision which provided that "[tihe foregoing
consent is granted on the condition that venue... shall be laid within
a country or judicial district, established by one of the said States or
by the United States, and situated wholly or partially within the Port
of New York District."208 Thus, the Court, when taking into account
both the consent to suit and venue provisions, determined that New
York and New Jersey had waived the Port Authority's immunity to
suit in federal district court.
The Feeney decision supports the Eighth Circuit's finding that Ne-
braska waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in two
respects. First, Feeney reaffirmed the proposition that federal courts
can determine whether states waived their sovereign immunity
through compact provisions.2 09 Secondly, Feeney established prece-
dent for the Eighth Circuit to consider other textual evidence of con-
sent to suit in federal courts within the Compact in order to determine
if Nebraska waived its immunity. Thus, Feeney is a key case to look at
in terms of guidance on whether the Eighth Circuit's waiver analysis
was correct in Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska.
Upon close examination, the differences between the venue and
consent provisions in the Port Authority compact in Feeney and Ne-
braska's Compact are insignificant. The Port Authority compact pro-
vided that "venue . . . shall be laid within a . . . judicial district,
established by... the United States."2 10 The Port Authority compact
venue provision, by referring to judicial districts established by the
United States, clearly encompassed federal district courts. In Ne-
braska's Compact, the venue provision similarly includes federal dis-
trict court. Although perhaps not as explicitly as Feeney, Article IV(e)
of the Compact provides that "[t]he Commission may initiate any pro-
ceedings ... before any court of law.., that has jurisdiction over any
matter arising under or relating to the terms of the provisions of this
compact" and this certainly includes federal district courts. The Com-
pact's venue provision encompasses lower federal courts because, as
was indicated earlier, interpretation of interstate compact language
207. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 307.
208. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-157 (West 1963); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 7101 (Mc-
Kinney 1979).
209. Although a prior case, Petty, had determined that a state can waive its immunity
from suit through an interstate compact, the majority was not clear on whether
the compact provisions were to be interpreted as federal law. See Petty v. Ten-
nessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). Feeney made it clear that
interstate compacts were indeed federal law and thus provided lower federal
courts federal question jurisdiction. See Feeney, 495 U.S. at 299.
210. Feeney, 495 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
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presents a federal question2 ii by which federal courts can exercise
subject matter jurisdiction.212 Thus, federal district courts must be
included within the Compact's designation of "any court of law ...
that has jurisdiction over any matter arising under or relating to the
terms of the provisions of this compact," since matters arising under
the terms and provisions of the Compact are federal questions.
Unquestionably, the Compact's consent to suit and venue provi-
sions could have been drafted more explicitly. However, complete ex-
plicitness is not required for a court to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity. Edelman made it clear that courts were entitled to inter-
pret waiver when the overwhelming implication of the text leaves no
other room for any other reasonable construction but waiver. 21 3 Con-
sequently, even though the Compact does not precisely articulate con-
sent to suit in the United States district courts, the only reasonable
construction of the consent to suit and venue provisions, when read
together, is that the party states consented to Commission suits in
federal court.
Nebraska, of course, did not interpret the venue provision as pro-
viding for lower federal court jurisdiction over disputes involving
party states. Nebraska pointed out that the word "federal" was not
used to modify the phrase "any court of law," whereas it was used in
the same provision to modify "agency, board or Commission."214 Addi-
tionally, Nebraska noted that other Compact provisions intended to
refer to lower federal courts do so explicitly. For example, Article IV(l)
provides that "[any person or party state aggrieved by a final decision
of the Commission may obtain judicial review of such decisions in the
United States District Court in the District wherein the Commission
maintains its headquarters."215 Thus, Nebraska contended that the
Eighth Circuit should have deduced that the omission of a "federal" or
a "United States District Court" modifier from the venue and consent
to suit clauses in question was indicative of the party states' intent not
to waive their immunity to suit in the lower federal courts. In making
this argument Nebraska cited the canon of statutory construction
211. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981) (holding that the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, the
interpretation of which presents a question of federal law).
212. See State ex rel. Nelson v. Centr. Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Comm'n, 834 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (D. Neb. 1993) (asserting that federal courts
have federal-question jurisdiction over interpretation of interstate compacts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
213. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
214. Compact, art. IV(e)
215. Compact, art. IV(a) (emphasis added).
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whereby disparate inclusion and exclusion of language is presumed to
be intentional and purposeful.
216
Although the canon of statutory construction cited by Nebraska is
an oft-used method to decipher statutory language, its application to
the Compact's consent to suit and venue provisions would render
those provisions virtually meaningless.21 7 If the Commission is to re-
quire the party states to perform their duties and obligations arising
under the Compact in any court of law that has jurisdiction, and ac-
cording to Nebraska, the lower federal courts are not encompassed by
"any court of law," then in what judicial forum is the Commission per-
mitted to appear?
The Supreme Court has determined that similarly created inter-
state compact commissions are not entitled to invoke the Court's origi-
nal jurisdiction in disputes against party states.2 18 Thus, the only
other alternative judicial forum to settle disputes under Nebraska's
proposed construction of the Compact would be in state court.2 19
If we were to employ Nebraska's proposed construction of the Com-
pact whereby state courts would be the only eligible judicial forum to
hear disputes between the Commission and party states, then the
question becomes: in what state court would such disputes be heard?
Nebraska would be assuredly surprised to learn that by entering the
Compact it was consenting to suit from the Commission within the
state courts of the other party states. Likewise, the four other party
states would probably be equally surprised to learn that the Com-
pact's venue provision for its judicial enforcement mechanism was
only applicable in the forum of the state whose compliance was sought
by the action. It is simply inconceivable that the party states intended
that disputes between the Commission and a party state arising
under the terms and provisions of the Compact would be settled in a
216. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20-21, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241
F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom. Nebraska v. Centr. Interstate
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 203 (2001) (mem.) (No. 01-87).
217. Meaningless interpretations of statutory language are to be avoided. See, e.g.,
Windsor on the River Assoc. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc., 7 F.3d 127, 130 (8th
Cir. 1993).
218. See Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Mgmt. Comm'n v. North
Carolina, 121 S. Ct. 2545 (2001) (mem.) (denying an interstate compact commis-
sion permission to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
219. However, it is unlikely that a consent to suit in other states' courts provision is
even necessary for other party states to submit Nebraska to their courts' jurisdic-
tion. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Court held that a suit brought
in the courts of one state against another state did not violate constitutional prin-
ciples of federalism or state comity. However, the Court did also note in Hall that
some constitutional constraints might be placed on the exercise of jurisdiction
over a sister state if the court action posed a "substantial threat to our constitu-
tional system of cooperative federalism." Id. at 424 n.24.
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forum as inherently biased as the state court of the state whose com-
pliance is sought.2 20
The notion that the courts of a party state are responsible for de-
termining whether Nebraska has complied with the Compact is ab-
surd.221 However, Nebraska's interpretation of the Compact's judicial
venue provision would require such a result in that it would exclude
the possibility of a federal judicial forum to hear Commission com-
plaints against non-complying party states. Since it is extraordinarily
unlikely that either Nebraska or any other party state intended for
the judicial enforcement mechanism to be exclusive to state courts,
Nebraska's interpretation of the Compact's venue provision would
render the provision meaningless and superfluous. Nebraska, by ar-
guing that the Compact's consent to suit provision does not include the
lower federal courts, essentially asked the Eighth Circuit to make the
same choice that Feeney posed to the Supreme Court roughly ten years
ago; either give the judicial venue provision its natural meaning or
give the provision no meaning at all. 22 2 And as was the case for the
Supreme Court in Feeney, this choice was not a difficult one to make,
as the Eighth Circuit appropriately decided to give the judicial venue
provision its natural meaning.
It should be noted that Nebraska did not contend that the Compact
has no enforcement mechanism. 22 3 Nebraska argued that Compact's
enforcement mechanism against non-complying party states is pro-
220. For authority documenting the inherent bias of state courts and perceptions
thereof, see Jerry Goldman & Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Lo-
cal Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 93 (1980); Neal
Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity
and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 407-32 (1992); see gen-
erally THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 536-37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Looke
ed. 1961).
221. It is absurd for two reasons. First, the idea that a party state's state court system
would be an impartial arbiter for disputes arising under the Compact is ridicu-
lous. It is simply not in the realm of comprehensibility that the states would take
such care as to enter into an artfully drafted Compact and leave it to any party
state's courts to interpret its meaning. Given the consent to suit and venue provi-
sions, a federal forum appears to have been the obvious intent of the party states
to settle disputes. The federal courts provide the states an impartial judicial fo-
rum that would have the authority of the supreme federal government behind it.
Secondly, a consent to suit provision within the Compact for suit in states courts
would be superfluous as such consent is not required by the Constitution. See
Hall, 440 U.S. at 410 (holding that a suit brought in the courts of one state
against another state did not violate constitutional principles of federalism or
state comity).
222. See Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 308 (1990) (stating
that the "Petitioner essentially presents the choice between giving the venue pro-
vision its natural meaning and giving the provision no meaning at all. Charged
with giving effect to the statute, we do not find the choice to be a difficult one.").
223. See Brief for Appellant at 32-33, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4263).
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vided within two other provisions. One of these provisions empowers
the Commission, upon two-thirds vote, to revoke the membership of
any party that is found to have arbitrarily or capriciously denied or
delayed the issuance of a disposal license.224 The other provision al-
lows the Commission, after notice and hearing, to suspend the privi-
leges or alternatively revoke the membership of any party state that
fails to comply with the terms of the Compact.2 25 Nebraska main-
tained that these suspension and revocation provisions provide the
Commission its exclusive enforcement mechanism against non-com-
plying party states.2 2
6
Although Nebraska was correct in that the Commission does have
the authority to revoke the membership or suspend the privileges of
non-complying party states, there is no indication within the Compact
that these enforcement mechanisms are exclusive. 22 7 Additionally, by
interpreting the aforementioned provisions as providing the Commis-
sion with the exclusive enforcement mechanism against non-comply-
ing states, Nebraska is again impliedly asserting that the consent to
suit and venue provisions are meaningless. After all, if the above pro-
visions are the Commission's exclusive enforcement mechanism
against party states, what possible meaning could be ascribed the
venue and consent to suit provisions?
E. Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska in the Context of the
Federalism Renaissance
There is no question that the United States Supreme Court has
undertaken a pro-states federalism renaissance over the past decade.
Numerous commentators have remarked on this renaissance.22s In a
broad context, decisions like Printz v. United States22 9 and United
States v. Lopez 23 0 have reigned in Congressional authority and deline-
ated the states' right to be free from pervasive federal government reg-
224. See Compact, art. V(g).
225. See Compact, art. VII(e).
226. See Brief for Appellant at 32-33, Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979
(8th Cir. 2001) (No. 99-4263).
227. See generally Compact arts. I to IX.
228. See Thomas W. Merrill, A New Age of Federalism?, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 153 (1998);
Robert F. Nagel, Federalism's Slight Revival, 1993 PuB. INT. L. REV. 25; Bill
Swinford & Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the States: Do Lopez
and Printz Represent a Broader Pro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319 (1998).
229. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (finding the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act uncon-
stitutional insofar as it required state law enforcement officers perform back-
ground checks because Congress cannot compel state executive officials to
implement a federal regulatory schema).
230. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional
because Congress surpassed its commerce power by regulating gun possession,
which does not substantially affect interstate commerce).
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ulation.2 3 1 In the more specific context of states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity, Seminole Tribe,2 32 College Savings
Bank,233 and Alden v. Maine23 4 have all marked a significant fortifi-
cation of the right of sovereign immunity among the states.2 35 These
recent decisions strengthening states' rights in the federal system
mark a significant departure from the nationalism trend that domi-
nated the judicial and political landscape during most of the twentieth
century.2 36 Moreover, this ideological shift in favor of states' rights is
not limited to the Supreme Court, but is part of a larger federalism
renaissance extending to the legislative arena as well. 237
Although the subjection of Nebraska to lower federal court jurisdic-
tion in regard to the Commission's claims may be contrary to general
states' rights principles, the Eighth Circuit's rationale for reaching
this determination was not. The Eighth Circuit recognized that the
federal judiciary should apply a presumption of non-waiver in cases of
a state's disputed waiver of sovereign immunity.2 38 The Eighth Cir-
cuit was only willing to find waiver if the Compact contained a "clear
declaration" of Nebraska's intent to submit to suit in federal court, or
if an "overwhelming implication from the [Compact's] text [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construction."23 9 Consequently, the
Eighth Circuit was solicitous toward Nebraska's right to sovereign im-
231. Although one could argue that the federalism renaissance has more to do with
curtailing Congressional power than expanding states rights, it is important to
realize that the states' rights and Congressional power are often mutually exclu-
sive. For example, when Congress regulates within states under the Commerce
Clause, it is in essence usurping state power.
232. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (declaring that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction").
233. 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224-25 (1999) (rejecting the lower standard of implied or con-
structive waiver for inferring states' waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity).
234. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (finding that states have the substantive right of sovereign
immunity in their own courts from suits brought by individuals under federal
law).
235. Although these cases concern Congress's power to abrogate sovereign immunity
as opposed to states' waiver of sovereign immunity, they are nonetheless instruc-
tive on the Court's unwillingness to infringe upon state sovereignty and
immunity.
236. See generally Jeffery G. Homrig, Alden v. Maine: A New Genre of Federalism
Shifts the Balance of Power, 89 CAL. L. REv. 183 (2001).
237. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
(codified in various sections of 2 U.S.C.) (attempting to restrict the imposition of
unfounded regulatory regimes on the federal government); see also DAVID B.
WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM 18 (1995) (commenting on Congress's
movement away from the use of categorical grants which restrict states' freedom
to choose how to spend public funds).
238. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887, 896-97 (8th Cir. 2000).
239. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)).
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munity, and in no way was attempting to undermine the federalism
renaissance by unjustifiably subjecting Nebraska to federal court ju-
risdiction. Rather, the Eighth Circuit gave effect to the Compact's
consent to suit and venue provisions which overwhelmingly implicate
the party states, including Nebraska, to federal suits from the
Commission.
F. Retroactivity and Money Damages
The Commission, as noted earlier, 24 0 has sought damages, an ac-
counting, declaratory relief, removal of Nebraskan officials from the
waste disposal licensing process, and the appointment of an impartial
third party to complete the licensing process. These potential reme-
dies present a number of undesirable potential outcomes for Nebraska
in this litigation. Most relevant for the citizens of and around Boyd
County is the possibility that the radioactive waste disposal facility
that they have vehemently opposed for so long2 41 will soon be con-
structed. Even under the restrictive remedial doctrine of Ex parte
Young, there is no question that the district court could grant the
Commission's prayer that the licensing review process be completed
by an impartial third party, as such relief would be prospective. The
more intriguing, and perhaps more relevant question for Nebraska cit-
izens as a whole, is whether the district court would have the author-
ity to grant the Commission's claims for damages. As noted earlier,
the resulting damages from the Commission's suit may well exceed
$160 million.2 42 Such a large damages award would be financially
devastating even in the best of fiscal times, however it would be espe-
cially difficult for Nebraska's treasury to absorb during an economic
downturn when the state's tax revenues have consistently fallen short
of state expenditures.
2 43
The Eighth Circuit has already stated that should the Commission
prevail with its claims, Nebraska may be held liable for damages.
24 4
240. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
241. The residents of Boyd County, Nebraska have been vocal opponents of the pro-
posed waste disposal facility site ever since the site selection has been an-
nounced. A local, Boyd County group (Boyd County Local Monitoring Committee)
has even been formed by state statute to monitor and represent Boyd County's
interests in the application process. This group's aggressive "monitoring" effort
has even led to litigation, as at one Point it and Boyd County filed suit against US
Ecology. See County ofBoyd v. US Ecology, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 960 (D. Neb. 1994)
(holding that Boyd County's fraud claim against USE was barred by res judicata
because of earlier suits initiated by Governor Nelson and Nebraska), affd, 48
F.3d 359 (8th Cir. 1995)
242. See OHanlon, supra note 26, at 2.
243. See supra note 27.
244. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"[w]e carefully considered the Eleventh Amendment issue before deciding it in
the course of the preliminary injunction appeal, and our holding that Nebraska
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The Eighth Circuit presumably based its declaration that Nebraska
could be held liable for damages on the fact that the Commission seeks
relief under the waiver doctrine as opposed to the narrower Ex parte
Young exception. While the Eighth Circuit's finding that Nebraska
could be held liable to the Commission for damages would only have
practical significance if the Commission were to prevail on its claims,
the Eighth Circuit's declaration is nonetheless deserving of analysis.
Preventing the award of money judgments against states is one of
the traditional core protections of the Eleventh Amendment. 24 5 The
exposure of a state's treasury has been identified as the "critical fac-
tor" in cases where a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity is in dis-
pute.2 4 6 Indeed, it was the states' treasuries that the Eleventh
Amendment specifically sought to protect. 24 7 Consequently courts
have historically been reluctant to expose state treasuries to damage
awards. 248
Despite courts' concern for the sanctity of state treasuries, dam-
ages have been awarded against states in federal court 24 9 and specifi-
cally in cases involving interstate compacts. 2 50 In Texas v. New
Mexico,2 51 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that even though Texas
and New Mexico's interstate water-sharing compact lacked a specific
provision for a remedy in the case of breach, New Mexico was entitled
to money damages from Texas for Texas' breach of the compact. Al-
though the Court recognized that there may be difficulties in enforcing
judgments against the states, it did not believe that such potential
waived its immunity from claims by the Commission, including claims for dam-
ages, is now the law of the case." (citation omitted)).
245. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1129 (1983).
246. See Feeney v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 873 F.2d 628, 631 (1989), affd on
other grounds, 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
247. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994) (stating that
"[aldoption of the [Eleventh] Amendment responded most immediately to the
States' fears that 'federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War
debts, leading to their financial ruin" (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 151 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
248. See id. at 48 (noting that protection of state treasuries is the most salient factor
in Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp.,
26 F.3d 728, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the most significant factor is
whether an entity has the power to raise its own funds); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5 F.3d
996, 999 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[tihe most important factor.., is whether
any monetary judgment would be paid out of the state treasury").
249. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001) (holding that a Special Master's
award of damages against Colorado for the violation of an interstate compact
does not violate the Eleventh Amendment).
250. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 129-131 (1987).
251. 482 U.S. 124 (1987).
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difficulties undermined the federal courts' authority to enter judg-
ments for damages against the states.
2 52
Texas v. New Mexico established the federal courts' authority to
award money damages against a state for breach of an interstate com-
pact even though the compact did not specifically provide for such an
award. However, Texas v. New Mexico is not directly analogous to the
Commission and Nebraska's dispute because Texas v. New Mexico was
an original action before the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the under-
lying principal articulated in Texas v. New Mexico that damages can
be awarded against a state even though that state did not specifically
consent within its compact to such a remedy is applicable to the Com-
mission's suit, as the Compact has no relevant remedy provision. In
fact, the Eighth Circuit relied upon the language within Texas v. New
Mexico when it found that Nebraska could be held liable for money
damages should the district court find that Nebraska breached the
Compact. The Eighth Circuit noted that "[t]here is nothing in the na-
ture of [interstate] compacts generally... that counsels against recti-
fying a failure to perform in the past as well as ordering future
performance called for by the Compact."2 53 Thus, the Eighth Circuit
concluded that Nebraska's waiver to suit from the Commission vis-A-
vis its assent to the Compact was broad enough to encompass suits for
damages.
G. Repercussions of the Eighth Circuit's Decision
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Nebraska can be held liable
for damages could have enormous ramifications for the state's budget
should the Commission prevail in its claim for damages. The total
tally for Nebraska, including interest and attorneys' fees, could reach
an estimated $160 million.2 54 Such an outcome would be crippling to
the state's budget and leads one to wonder whether the state would
comply with such an award. The prospect of a state refusing to pay a
federal court's damages award could be enough for the U.S. Supreme
Court to hear an assured appeal from Nebraska where it could recon-
sider the imposition of damages on Nebraska. However, until the dis-
trict court hears the case, any conjectures about the consequences of a
potential damages award are speculative and premature.
IV. CONCLUSION
The licensing process for the low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility has been ensnarled in controversy from the start. And unfor-
252. See id. at 131.
253. See Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, 241 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir. 2001) (quot-
ing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987)).
254. Assuming of course the Commission is able to link all of its claimed damages to
Nebraska's bad faith. See O'Hanlon, supra note 26, at 2.
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tunately for Nebraskans, it does not look like it will have a happy end-
ing, as the Eighth Circuit's determination that Nebraska waived its
sovereign immunity to federal suits from the Commission by entering
the Compact has exposed Nebraska to an extraordinary liability.
However unpleasant the Eighth Circuit's decision in Entergy Ar-
kansas, Inc. v. Nebraska is for Nebraskans, the finding of waiver of
sovereign immunity is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The
Supreme Court addressed the issue of deriving a state's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity from the language contained within an interstate
compact in Feeney. In Feeney, the Court held that a compact's consent
to suit and venue provisions, when read together, left no other reason-
able interpretation besides waiver of immunity to suit in federal court.
The Compact's consent to suit and venue provisions dictated that the
Eighth Circuit reach a similar conclusion in Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v.
Nebraska. Compacts present federal questions that bestow jurisdic-
tion upon the lower federal courts pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Conse-
quently, Nebraska's assent to language permitting the Commission to
bring an action against the party states in "any court of law ... that
has jurisdiction" represents a definitive waiver of sovereign immunity
in that it leaves no room for any other reasonable construction other
than waiver to suit from the Commission in federal court.
Nebraska's proposed interpretation of the Compact's consent to
suit and venue provisions would render those provisions essentially
meaningless and superfluous, as according to Nebraska, they would
not provide the Commission any judicial enforcement mechanism
against non-complying party states. Thus, Nebraska's interpretation
of the Compact would thwart the central aim of the Compact's consent
to suit and venue provisions, which was to provide an independent
judicial forum to entertain disputes between the Commission and the
party states that arise under the Compact.
The Eighth Circuit properly rejected Nebraska's interpretation of
the Compact in Entergy Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, and accordingly
gave effect to each word and clause within the Compact. The Eighth
Circuit did not disrupt the fundamental balance of federalism or apply
a sub-constitutional standard for interpreting a state's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity. A state is entitled to waive its Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity at its pleasure and that is exactly what
Nebraska did when it assented to the Compact's consent to suit and
venue provisions. Consequently, Nebraska must now defend against,
and possibly answer for in the form of money damages, the Commis-
sion's claims that it allegedly acted in bad faith during the licensing
application review process for the Boyd County waste disposal facility.
Thomas 0. Kelley
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